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On Feb. 4, Asst. Treasury Secretary David Mulford testified before a joint hearing of the House
Subcommittees on International Develompent Institutions and Finance and on International
Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy. Mulford's testimony was focused on presenting the
administration opposition to any form of debt forgiveness, and its commitment to "stay the course"
of Secretary James Baker's debt strategy. For instance, he said that US participation in a recent
Mexican debt-bond exchange offer with private banks should not be interpreted as support for
general debt forgiveness schemes. "Such schemes would shift the risk of private sector loans to the
public sector and require major expenditures of taxpayer money. We continue to firmly oppose
them." Mulford asserted the Treasury Department's continuing support for a "sustained growth"
program as applied to debtor nations, described as the only viable and widely acceptable approach
to international debt problems. This program, he said, is based on four principles: the central
importance of economic growth in easing the debt burden over time; the need for market-oriented
reforms in debtor nations to achieve such growth; new debt and equity financing, and the return
of flight capital; and, a case-by-case approach to address the individual needs of each country.
Highlights of Mulford's testimony appear below. *Mulford said that he recognized recent actions
by several banks to increase reserves and by a few to write down loans, and the Mexican exchange
proposal have raised the topic of general debt reduction and the willingness of banks to share in
absorbing a portion of the apparent market discount on bank claims. This issue, he said, merits
further clarification. Efforts by commercial banks and debtor governments to voluntarily convert
loans and other instruments at mutually satisfactory prices in an effort to reduce overall debt
burdens can play a useful role within one basic debt strategy. These can include debt-equity swaps,
debt- conservation swaps, and securitization of commercial bank debt, among other techniques.
However, the recent US support for the Mexican scheme should not be interpreted as general
support for forgiveness schemes. *According to Mulford, for the 15 major debtors as a whole, GDP
growth has improved substantially since 1982, and export earnings and imports increased last
year. Interest-to-export ratios are expected to average 30% in 1982-86. Perhaps the most important
change during the past two years has been in debtor attitudes. The debtor countries are increasingly
focusing on the importance of market-led growth, undertaking the reforms necessary to achieve
the same. Mulford mentioned the case of Mexico, which despite an earthquake and fluctuating
oil prices, managed to keep its stabilization plan on track. He also mentioned Mexican trade
liberalization, tax reform, privatization efforts, and market-oriented pricing policies. Next, he said,
Ecuador adjusted well to two shocks: lower oil prices and a devastating earthquake, maintaining
inflation at a 24% level and offsetting lost oil revenues with increased taxes. Also mentioned was
Colombia, with a 5% growth rate last year. It has decreased the fiscal deficit, and liberalized the
foreign exchange and trade system. Bogota managed last year to raise $1 billion from commercial
banks without entering into a rescheduling agreement or International Monetary Fund program.
Meanwhile, several debtor nations have "failed to follow through on needed structural changes."
Next, reduced commodity prices and export earnings in 1985-86 exacerbated interest-to-export
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ratios for some. Strong protectionist pressures in industrial and developing nations are matters of
serious concern. *At the annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank last September, Mulford
said Secretary Baker agreed that a World Bank general capital increase is now necessary to assure
that capital does not act as a constraint on the ability of the Bank to support continued reforms or
fulfill its key role in the implementation of the debt strategy negotiations now underway. Mulford
said the administration intends to seek authorization and appropriations for US participation in the
capital increase during fiscal year 1989. Baker suggested the creation of a new external contingency
facility at the IMF to help cushion the adverse effects on IMF stand-by agreements of unforeseen
external developments such as lower commodity prices, lower export volumes, natural disasters,
and sustained higher interest rates. This facility would be financed from the Fund's current financial
resources. Next, Baker proposed modifications in Fund lending policies in longer term programs
in order to increase emphasis on structural policies for growth and stability. These modifications
would involve reducing the frequency of performance criteria reviews and disbursements in
Fund programs and encouraging members to give greater attention to structural measures in
formulating their economic policies. Baker also emphasized the importance of market-driven
financial instruments to meet the needs of both debtor nations and the banking community to
devise new financing packages. The "menu approach" may include, among other items, trade and
project loans to support private sector production and growth; bonds or notes which are convertible
into local equity; exit bonds to help streamline new financing packages; lending facilities in which
lenders can earmark funds for private entities, while the foreign exchange risk is lodged with the
central bank; debt-equity swaps, which reduce debt and debt service burdens, while improving the
debt-equity mix in foreign obligations; purchase of debt instruments by charitable organizations
for social and environmental use in debtor countries; limited voluntary interest capitalization; and,
general balance of payment loans. *Mulford discussed the role of commercial banks in debt strategy,
and particularly US banks' decision to increase reserves and write down loans. By the end of the
second quarter of 1987, all money center banks had reserve coverage ranging from 18 to 25%, while
the regional and smaller banks had established much higher reserve coverage. Then, in December
1987 the Bank of Boston began a second round of additions to reserves. Many of the regional
banks that had built coverage to 30 or 40% in the second quarter decided that for them the reserve
coverage of about 50% was more appropriate. A few banks have written down or in some cases sold
a portion of their Third World claims. According to Mulford, the enchanced position of the banks
will enable them to be more demanding in terms of debtor country support for the adjustment
process. The banks will be looking for a stronger commitment from debtors when a given financingadjustment program is launched. *Mulford described the Mexican debt exchange proposal and its
implications for the current debt strategy. Mexico will offer to issue to its commercial creditors 20year government bonds with the backing of US Treasury 20-year securities. The Mexican bonds,
to be denominated in dollars, will pay interest on a floating rate basis at a rate of 1-5/8 percent
over the Libor. This rate is twice the 13/16 percent above the Libor rate Mexico currently pays to
its commercial bank creditors. The potential purchasers of Mexican bonds will voluntarily submit
bids specifying the dollar face amount of existing debt that the purchaser is willing to tender and
the smaller dollar face amount of Mexican bonds that the purchaser is willing to accept in exchange.
Mexico's debt conversion offer is possible because of the relatively high level of its international
reserves which are due to higher oil revenues and adjustment efforts. While the US Treasury's
participation in future proposals will be considered on a case-by-case basis, no commitment has
been made to engage in similar transactions. *For Mulford, resolving the debt problem requires
the debtor nations to adopt market-oriented reforms and use financial resources more efficiently.
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This means limiting the growth of new debt to that which can be serviced. It also means where
feasible reducing debt service obligations. As a general rule, the stock of debt should not increase at
a faster pace than the debtor's capacity to grow and service debt. Other measures that could increase
external capital flows include policies aimed at attracting foreign investment and flight capital.
Domestic policy reform in developing nations is essential to help deepen domestic capital markets
and reduce their relative reliance on external finance. Although individual components of these
reforms will differ from country to country, some of the areas of greatest importance include tax
reforms, the reduction of fiscal deficits, the liberalization of trade and investment, privatization of
public sector companies, and measures to increase savings and investment. *According to Mulford,
provisions in pending trade legislation for the creation of an international debt facility to purchase at
a discount and securitize or swap sovereign debt continue to be unacceptable to the administration.
Such legislation would shift the risk on Third World loans from commercial banks to the public
sector as the principal means of solving international debt problems. Creation of a debt facility,
he said, would represent a move away from the case-by-case approach, which is not feasible, and
would undermine international support for and progress under the current debt strategy. Instead,
the consolidation of debt claims in a large international facility is almost certain to politicize the
development process, distracting debtor and creditor attention from the difficult but fundamental
economic adjustment issues. By raising expectations of a bail-out, the creation of such a facility
would dampen the resolve of the debtor to undertake necessary reforms and encourage unilateral
actions to maximize debt forgiveness. Moreover, said Mulford, there is little interest among the key
industrial nations in allocating funds for such a facility, and there is increasing debtor recognition
that other market-related options have greater potential for both reducing debt burdens and
maintaining essential financial flows.

-- End --
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